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1. INTRODUCTION
DESPITE the widespread availability of modern communication technologies, information 
costs still play a crucial role in shaping world trade patterns. As surveyed by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2004), these costs, equivalent to an ad valorem tax of 6 per cent, largely
account for the puzzling persistence of distance and border impediments to trade.
According to Rauch (2001), social and business transnational networks are likely to allevi-
ate some of these information failures. Cross-border networks are prone to substitute for
organised markets in matching international buyers and sellers, and this is especially true of
differentiated products. In this respect, co-ethnic networks are of more particular interest, as
illustrated for instance by the model of Casella and Rauch (2003). Immigrants’ ties with their
home country may promote trade for at least three reasons. First, immigrants have a good
knowledge of the customs, language, laws as well as business practices in both the host and
home countries. Accordingly, their presence helps in bridging the information gap between
sellers and buyers on both sides, hence promoting bilateral trade opportunities. Second, immi-
grant networks may provide contract enforcement through sanctions and exclusions, which
substitutes for weak institutional rules and reduces trade costs. In addition to the two previous
channels, immigrants bring their taste for homeland products, which should make their trade-
creating impact even more salient on imports.
In this paper, we take seriously the econometric challenge to assess the trade-creating effect
of migrations. Contrary to the plethoric literature on this topic, we use very geographically
detailed and sectoral data to assess this relationship. We also implement sophisticated econo-
metric techniques to tackle the notorious issue of endogeneity inherent in this relationship.
Our results corroborate the almost uniform finding that immigrant populations encourage
trade between host regions and home countries. However, our elasticity is around two times
smaller than the most conservative estimates found in the literature (i.e. those of Herander and
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Saavedra, 2005, for US states exports). We investigate the protrade effect of foreign-born
French residents on the exports and imports of French departements with around 100 countries
in the world. The novelty consists in crossing the effect of immigration with both the quality
of institutions in the home country and the complexity of traded goods.
The trade-promoting effect of immigration is now well documented (see Wagner et al.,
2002; for an extensive review). Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998) and Girma and Yu
(2002) find a significant trade-creating impact of immigrants settled in the United States, Can-
ada and the United Kingdom, respectively. Rauch and Trindade (2002) exhibit a diaspora net-
work rationale ruling this protrade phenomenon by showing that South Asian country pairs
with a higher proportion of Chinese immigrants trade more with each other.
However, there are many reasons to suspect that, at the country level, the correlation
between trade and immigration might arise from omitted common determinants (such as colo-
nial ties, language or cultural proximity) or reverse causality if immigrants prefer to settle in
countries that have good trade relationships with their home country.
Accordingly, a few recent attempts investigate the link between the spatial patterns of trade
and immigrants’ settlements within countries. Wagner et al. (2002) are the first to test a cau-
sal relationship between trade and immigration at the scale of Canadian provinces. The inclu-
sion of country-fixed effects allows to control for the common determinants of trade and
immigration at the national level. At the same time, cross-sectional variability in trade and
immigration at the regional level provides sufficient information to identify the protrade effect
of immigrants. The authors confirm the positive and significant elasticity of trade with respect
to immigration, at the regional level.
Further evidence is provided for the US states exports. Herander and Saavedra (2005) dis-
entangle the impact of both the in-state and out-state stocks of immigrants. The outstanding
impact of in-state immigrants pinpoints the key role of local social interactions as a major
source of technological externalities. Building on the same previous data set, Dunlevy (2006)
further shows that the protrade effect of immigrants increases with the degree of corruption
and with language similarity in the partner country. Finally, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008)
explore the temporal scope of the data and regress the 1990–2000 time variation in trade on
the related time variation in immigrants’ settlements. This approach bears the advantage of
controlling for pair-specific unobserved characteristics. The protrade effect of immigrants is
found to exhibit a large heterogeneity driven by a few countries only. In a related strand of
literature, Combes et al. (2005) for France and Millimet and Osang (2007) for the United
States show that within-country migrations affect positively the volume of inter-regional trade
flows.
Our paper extends this literature in three directions. First, the relationship between trade
and immigration is studied at a lower geographical scale than any previous North American
study. French departements are almost 30 times tinier than American states and more than
100 times smaller than Canadian provinces. A spurious correlation between trade and immi-
gration is less likely to occur at this very fine geographical scale, which mitigates the likeli-
hood that immigrants would capture other unobserved variables possibly correlated with trade.
Typically, the French country hosts a large share of North African immigrants due to its past
colonial history. History could also explain why France registers very large trade flows with
North African countries. However, at the country level, it is difficult to assess that North Afri-
can immigrants are the source of such trade. By way of contrast, at the very fine geographical
scale of departements, finding a strong trade-creating impact of North African immigrants
would be hardly rationalised without a true causal effect, especially given that informational
spillovers decrease strongly with distance. Actually, we do find that immigration exerts a sig-
nificant positive impact on trade: doubling the number of immigrants settled in a departement
boosts its exports to the home country by 7 per cent and its imports by 4 per cent.
Second, we address econometric questions endemic to gravity-type estimations. We first
tackle the issue of specification and selection biases due to zero flows by resorting to the
quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator recently proposed by Head et al. (2009). We
then turn to the bias arising from possibly omitted common determinants for immigration and
trade or from reverse causality. To circumvent both sources of endogeneity, we include coun-
try- and departement-specific fixed effects in the regression, and we resort to an instrumental
variables approach, where lagged stocks of foreign-born French residents serve as instru-
ments. The previous orders of magnitude remain astonishingly robust to these econometric
refinements.
Finally, we evaluate the heterogeneous impact of immigrants along two intertwined dimen-
sions: the complexity of traded goods and the quality of institutions in the partner country.
Indeed, Rauch and Trindade (2002) show that the trade-creating effect of Chinese networks is
larger for differentiated products than for homogeneous or reference price goods. The fact that
immigrants matter more for differentiated goods can be taken as a support for the informa-
tion-cost-saving channel of transnational networks. Besides, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)
and Berkowitz et al. (2006) show that the quality of institutions impacts drastically on the
volume of bilateral trade. Berkowitz et al. (2006) point out that the quality of institutions mat-
ters more for complex commodities, which exhibit characteristics difficult to fully specify in a
contract. This is the reason why good institutions may reduce transaction costs when contracts
are more incomplete. However, they do not study whether transnational networks could be a
substitute for weak institutions, especially in the trade of complex products, as suggested by
Rauch (2001).1
Building on these insights, we disentangle the protrade impact of immigrants across both
the partner’s institution quality and the complexity of traded goods. In this respect, our paper
emphasises two main innovating results. First, immigrants especially matter for the imports of
complex goods, regardless of institution quality in the home country. Turning to the imports
of simple products, immigrants matter only when the quality of institutions at home is weak.
Therefore, immigrants do not, holding institutional quality constant, encourage imports of
simple goods, but do encourage imports from countries with weak institutions. Consequently,
our paper adds to the literature the idea that imports of simple goods do not provide the infor-
mational challenges that immigrants can help overcome, but that immigrants still may play a
role in promoting trade if the source of ‘simple’ imports is a foreign country with weak legal
institutions. Second, the trends are less marked for exports. The protrade impact of immi-
grants on exports is positive only when they come from countries with weak institutions,
regardless of the complexity of products.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the augmented gravity
specification we use to evaluate the trade-creating impact of foreign-born French residents
and discusses several econometric issues. It also describes the trade and immigration data for
French regions. Section 3 presents the benchmark empirical results. Section 4 disentangles the
1 In this respect, Dunlevy (2006) is a noticeable exception. He shows that the impact of immigrants on
US states exports is more important when institutions in the home country are weak.
trade-creating impact of immigration across simple or complex products and across countries
with different quality of institutions. Section 5 concludes.
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION, ECONOMETRICS AND DATA
To investigate the protrade effect of social networks, we need a benchmark to evaluate the
amount of trade expected absent any immigrants’ settlements. Following Combes et al.
(2005), we present the gravity norm we use to provide this benchmark. This section also dis-
cusses some of the econometric pitfalls traditionally encountered in gravity estimations. The
following presentation draws on the exposition of Head et al. (2010).
a. Model Specification
The rationale behind the gravity model is that the value of trade between two locations
(yij) is generated by the adjusted economic sizes of both the supplying location i (Si) and the
demanding location j (Mj) and inhibited by all the sources of ‘trade resistance’ between them
(/ij):
yij ¼ GSiMj/ij; (1)
G is a factor that does not vary across regions. Head et al. (2010) refer to Si and Mj as the
monadic terms and /ij as the dyadic term. The usual practice is to log-linearise this equation
and to find proxies for the monadic and dyadic terms:
ln yij ¼ lnGþ ln Si þ lnMj þ ln/ij: (2)
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) provide clear-cut theoretical microfoundations for the
monadic terms: they depend not only on nominal economic size (for instance GDP), but also
on nonlinear functions of all pairwise dyadic terms, called the ‘multilateral resistance indices’
(MRIs). A proper control for these monadic terms in gravity estimations is challenging.2 The
primary question we focus on is whether the spatial distribution of immigrants coming from a
country j affects the trade of hosting departements with such country. Hence, we are not inter-
ested in the country- or departement-specific determinants of trade. This is the reason why we
adopt a fixed-effect approach a la Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and introduce two sets
of dummies in the gravity equation. The inclusion of country-fixed effects (fj) is meant to
control for all standard country-specific determinants of trade: membership to a common trade
or currency bloc (e.g. the Eurozone or the European Union), landlocked nature, colonial ties
or common languages. The other set of dummies (fi) controls for the departement-specific
determinants of trade, such as the density of economic activity or any natural or artificial
2 Head et al. (2010) give a clear review of the state of the art on the econometric specification of the
gravity equation. Four solutions are encountered in the literature: (i) a nonlinear approach, proposed by
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), where MRIs are explicitly computed, (ii) a fixed-effect approach,
also proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), where monadic terms are controlled for by a set
of importer and exporter dummies, (iii) the bonus vetus OLS approach, proposed by Baier and
Bergstrand (2009) and recently adapted by Behrens et al. (2012) based on spatial econometrics, where
first-order Taylor expansions of MRIs are introduced in the specification, and (iv) the tetrad approach,
proposed by Head et al. (2010), where monadic terms are suppressed thanks to the computation of
export ratios.
endowments. Finally, it is worth noting that, in this two-way fixed-effect setting, only the dya-
dic determinants (/ij) of bilateral trade can be identified.
Regarding this dyadic term, we follow Combes et al. (2005) and assume that trade costs
do not only depend on distance and contiguity, but also are inversely correlated with the num-
ber of immigrants coming from country j settled in region i. We choose /ij as a multiplicative
function of (i) the great circle distance between i and j, (ii) a dummy indicating whether or
not the departement and the country are contiguous,3 and finally, (iii) the stock of foreign-
born residents in i originating from country j, migij:
/ij ¼ distbijð1þmigijÞa expðccontigijÞ: (3)
We add an error term (eij) that controls for all unobservable dyadic terms uncorrelated with
distance, contiguity or immigrants’ stock. The baseline specification we estimate is thus the
following two-way fixed-effect log-linearised equation:
ln yij ¼ fi þ fj  b ln distij þ ccontigij þ a lnð1þmigijÞ þ ij: (4)
In what follows, we estimate this specification for exports and imports separately.
b. Econometric Issues
Three major econometric problems are usually encountered when estimating gravity mod-
els. The first problem deals with the treatment of zero flows. The log-linearised specification
(4) can only be estimated on strictly positive flows. Various methodologies have been pro-
posed to control for the selection bias arising from keeping positive flows only. Dunlevy
(2006) takes the logarithm of one plus the value of the flow as a dependent variable. He also
estimates a Tobit model with an arbitrary zero threshold. Herander and Saavedra (2005) use
the extended Tobit estimation first proposed by Eaton and Tamura (1994), where the threshold
is estimated. This technique, also used by Wagner et al. (2002), rests on a maximum likeli-
hood estimation of the log-linearised model.
A second issue concerns the heteroscedasticity of error terms in levels. In theoretical mod-
els, indeed, the gravity equation takes a multiplicative form, as in specification (1); hence, if
the error term in levels is heteroscedastic, OLS estimates for the log-linearised model are
biased.4 To tackle simultaneously the zero-flow and the heteroscedastic issues, Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) initiated a novel approach by estimating the gravity equation in levels.
They propose a easy-to-implement QML estimation for the gravity equation, under the
assumption that error terms in levels are distributed according to a Poisson distribution. These
authors find that the elasticity of trade flows to distance is twice as small as the one estimated
from OLS. However, the Poisson specification builds on the assumption that conditional vari-
ance equals conditional mean in the data VðyijjxijÞ ¼ EðyijjxijÞ. Head et al. (2009) provide a
3 This dummy is equal to one for only a small subset of departements contiguous to Belgium/Luxem-
bourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy or Spain.
4 This is due to Jensen’s inequality, according to which the expected value of the logarithm of a random
variable is not equal to the logarithm of the expected value of this variable. Furthermore, the expected
value of the logarithm of a random variable depends not only on the expected value of the variable, but
also on the other moments of its distribution, especially the variance. Under heteroscedasticity in levels,
this variance is a function of explanatory variables, which generates endogeneity in the log-linearised
model.
more robust two-step negative binomial (2NB) procedure that allows the conditional variance
to be a quadratic function of the mean, VðyijjxijÞ ¼ EðyijjxijÞ þ g2EðyijjxijÞ2.5 Hence, in what
follows, we compare baseline OLS and 2NB estimates in order to test whether the protrade
effect of immigrants is robust to these two presumably important biases: zero flows and het-
eroscedasticity in levels.
The third issue is endogeneity, which may arise from two major sources: omitted variables
and reverse causality. At the national scale, one can imagine that preferential links between
two countries (resulting from a common colonial history for instance) generate simultaneously
trade and immigrant flows. Furthermore, the existence of a strong trade partnership may push
people to migrate, creating a reverse causality between trade and immigration. Gould (1994)
provides two reasons to believe that cross-section estimations actually preclude the endogene-
ity bias, at the national level. First, migrations are expected to be more exogenous than trade
flows, because they are determined by family reunifications in the first place. As recently
analysed by Thierry (2004), this is also a plausible explanation for France. Second, in addition
to family entrance motivations, immigration inflows are conveyed by wage differentials and
the pre-existence of a same native/speaking community, rather than by trade opportunities.
This is also what suggests the analysis conducted by Bartel (1989) or Munshi (2003) for the
United States and by Jayet and Bolle-Ukrayinchuk (2007) for France.
Furthermore, these two sources of endogeneity are partially mitigated when we turn to
infra-national data. In specification (4), the country- and region-fixed effects control for a
large set of common observable and unobservable determinants for trade and immigration
flows. Nevertheless, it could be argued that reverse causality and omitted variables are still
likely to prevail at the infra-national level. To be sure that this relationship is not driven by
omitted variables, Wagner et al. (2002) control for the commonality of language, that is, the
probability that a random citizen of a given region speaks the same language as a random cit-
izen of the trading partner. We cannot compute such a variable in the French case. We follow
another route and instrument the current stock of immigrants with past stocks in 1975, 1982
and 1990. These lagged stocks are valid instruments as long as they determine the current
stock of immigrants and do not determine current trade flows beyond their effect on the cur-
rent stock of immigrants. We provide further support for this view in what follows. The
instrumental variables approach has been rarely implemented in the literature.6
c. Data
Trade data consist in the exports and imports of 94 French metropolitan departements with
around 100 countries. French decentralised customs services record the value of trade flows
exclusive of transit shipments, as well as the origin/destination of shipments, that is, those
where goods are actually produced/consumed. Although trade values are available since 1978,
we focus exclusively on the recent period to ensure data compatibility with immigrants’
stocks. Furthermore, in order to prevent noisy observations due to time-specific shock (such
as the euro adoption), we average trade flows over three years (1998, 1999 and 2000) for each
departement–country pairs.
5 Gourieroux et al. (1984) show that QML estimators are consistent as long as the expected value of the
dependent variable is well specified and thus robust to an error in the specification of the true data
generating process for the error term. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for further details.
6 Combes et al. (2005) stands as an exception.
Trade flows are originally available at a very disaggregated industrial level, according to
the Standard Goods Classification for Transport Statistics (NST/R classification). We match
this classification with the one proposed by Rauch (1999) to characterise the complexity or
the degree of differentiability of products.7
The 1999 French population census provides us with the exhaustive information on the
number of foreign-born residents by departement and country pairs. We define immigrants as
residents born abroad with a foreign nationality. In the empirical part, we also use the lagged
stocks of immigrants to tackle the endogeneity issue. These figures are provided by French
population censuses for the years 1975, 1982 and 1990. Appendix A provides further details
on exports, imports and immigration data.
It is worth stressing that most of the variability in the data comes from the cross-country
dimension of the sample. For instance, the regression of trade flows on country-specific dum-
mies returns an adjusted R2 of 51 per cent for exports, 61 per cent for imports and 70 per
cent for immigration.
We wipe out this cross-country variation with a set of country-fixed effects. We also
include departement dummies to control for the common observable or unobservable determi-
nants of trade and immigrants inside France.
Due to the introduction of these two sets of dummies, the protrade impact of immigrants is
identified along the within-country and within-departement data variability. Table 1 depicts
the within-country and within-departement correlation between exports, imports, distance and
immigration.8 As expected, distance is negatively correlated with exports and imports, the cor-
relation being stronger for imports. By way of contrast, immigration is significantly and posi-
tively correlated with both exports and imports. Distance and immigration are also negatively
correlated, as it is well known that immigration flows also share a gravity pattern. Appen-
dix A provides further summary statistics on the data.
3. THE PROTRADE EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS
a. Benchmark Results
Table 2 provides the basic results drawn from estimating specification (4). In columns
labelled OLS, we report the results drawn from the log-linear form (null flows are left out of
TABLE 1
Within-country and within-departement correlations
Variables Exports Imports Distance Immigrants
Exports 1.000
Imports 0.144 1.000
Distance 0.090 0.137 1.000
Immigrants 0.066 0.043 0.090 1.000
Note:
All correlations are significant at the 1 per cent level.
7 See Appendix B for details.
8 More formally, this is the correlation between the residuals of the regression of each variable on coun-
try-specific and departement-specific dummies.
the sample). We also estimate the same specification in levels (columns 2NB). We run this
regression twice: first on the sample restricted to positive flows (columns (3) and (7)), and
second on the whole sample (columns (4) and (8)). We run two sets of regressions for exports
and imports separately.
(i) Log-linear Specification
In columns (1) and (5), trade impediments are proxied by distance and contiguity only.
Elasticity has expected signs. Exports, as well as imports, decrease with distance and increase
with contiguity. The elasticity of imports to distance is twice larger than that of exports.
Although there is not any obvious reason for such a phenomenon, it is worth recalling that, in
this two-way fixed-effect setting, elasticity is estimated on the within-variability of the data.
Hence, identification relies drastically on close countries for which distance differentials
across regions remain high in comparison with countries located further away. For instance,
Paris and Marseille are almost equally distant from the United States, but not from Germany.
For more distant countries, the variability in distance is reduced. Nevertheless, the variability
in trade flows remains fairly high: a small difference in distance can be associated with a
large difference in trade values.
In columns (2) and (6), we add the stock of immigrants in the specification in logs. Con-
trary to most of the previous regional studies, we are able to assess separately the impact of
immigration on exports and imports. Immigrants have a strongly significant impact. They
promote exports as well as imports: doubling their number yields a 7 per cent
(20.102 = 1.07) increase in the value of exports and a 4 per cent (20.054 = 1.04) increase in
the value of imports. The protrade effect of immigration on imports is almost twice smaller
than on exports. This casts doubt on the existence of a preference channel. However, we
will see later that such a difference, which is barely significant here, is in any case not very
robust.
TABLE 2
Benchmark results
Exports Imports
OLS OLS 2NB > 0 2NB ≥ 0 OLS OLS 2NB > 0 2NB ≥ 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance 0.81*
(0.089)
0.777*
(0.085)
0.963*
(0.1)
0.961*
(0.104)
1.488*
(0.128)
1.480*
(0.127)
1.612*
(0.143)
1.638*
(0.157)
Contiguity 0.452*
(0.167)
0.273***
(0.163)
0.123
(0.163)
0.099
(0.169)
0.445**
(0.198)
0.342***
(0.201)
0.029
(0.205)
0.0009
(0.237)
Immigrants 0.102*
(0.018)
0.091*
(0.019)
0.109*
(0.021)
0.054**
(0.027)
0.094*
(0.035)
0.089**
(0.041)
Observations 9,033 9,033 9,033 9,400 8,110 8,110 8,110 9,494
Adjusted R2 0.844 0.844 0.8 0.8
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported
here.
(ii) Robust standard errors in brackets, with *, ** and *** denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels,
respectively.
The trade-creating impact of immigrants is up to fourfold smaller than the standard estimates
found in the literature,9 as we find an elasticity ranging from 0.05 to 0.12, in our more conserva-
tive specification. Therefore, most of the estimates provided in the literature are tainted with an
upward omitted variable bias that can be controlled for by using country-fixed effects. Neverthe-
less, we still find an impact of immigrants nearly twice smaller than the 0.18 elasticity found by
Herander and Saavedra (2005) for the US states’ exports, even though their study tackles the
issue of endogeneity seriously. As we use the same fixed-effect strategy, the difference between
our estimates and their elasticity might be mainly driven by the geographical scale of study. It is
not surprising to find a lower trade-creating impact of immigrants at the scale of departements,
which are much smaller than countries or even federal states: all the network effects possibly
triggered by immigrants located in surrounding departements do not show up. The counterpart,
however, is that we are more confident in the true causal rationale driving our estimated effect.
The impact of distance and contiguity is also reduced when the stock of immigrants is
accounted for. Contiguity is only significant at the 10 per cent level. Its impact reduces drasti-
cally once immigrants are controlled for. Indeed, immigrants coming from neighbouring coun-
tries, such as Belgium, Germany or Italy, locate according to a gravity pattern. Consequently,
the share of immigrants originating from these neighbouring countries is much higher in the
regions behind the border than anywhere else in France.
(ii) Specification in Levels
We push further the evidence by testing the robustness of the results to two kinds of possible
biases: specification and selection due to neglecting zero flows in the log-linear specification.
Columns (3)–(4) and (7)–(8) in Table 2 report the results of the 2NB estimation procedure
(equation (4) in levels). The positive and significant impact of immigrants is confirmed. Further-
more, it is of the same order of magnitude than in the log-linear specification: doubling the num-
ber of immigrants from a country yields a 6.5 per cent increase in both the values of exports and
imports with this trade partner. Hence, the results do not change drastically when moving to a
log-linear specification. Furthermore, they are not driven by the zero-flow truncation. In columns
(4) and (8), where null flows are included in the sample, results remain barely the same.
Finally, we provide further robustness checks based on different estimation techniques (see
Table 3A in Appendix C). The orders of magnitude are virtually the same in all procedures,
but the Poisson QML estimation. This is probably due to the assumption that conditional
mean equals conditional variance, which would not be valid in our data. Therefore, the pro-
trade effect of immigration is robust to both specification and selection biases. We now turn
to the endogeneity problem in the log-linear specification.
b. An Instrumental Variables Approach
Despite the inclusion of fixed effects and the use of a fine geographical scale, our results
could still be plagued by the endogeneity of immigrants’ stocks. We use an instrumental vari-
ables approach to circumvent this issue within the log-linear model.10 We choose the lagged
stocks of immigrants for the years 1975, 1982 and 1990 as instruments.
9 See the summary table provided in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008).
10 Nonlinear models, as the negative binomial model, remain quite hard to instrument, as reviewed by
Windmeijer (2006). Instrumenting is all the more challenging in our setting as we include numerous
dummies. This is the reason why, in this section, we exclusively focus on the log-linear specification.
(i) Relevance of Instruments
In order to be relevant, instruments have to be correlated with the current stock of immi-
grants. Hence, we should observe some persistence in the geography of immigrants’ settle-
ments within France, by country of origin. This is a well-known established empirical fact.
For instance, Jayet and Bolle-Ukrayinchuk (2007) find that, in France, past settlements
strongly determine the location of new immigrants, due to the existence of social networks or
to family motives. Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations between past and current stocks
of immigrants. We see that these correlations are indeed fairly high, even though they
decrease as time lag raises. This is a first support for validating instruments.
Nevertheless, strict relevance depends on the partial correlation between the endogenous
variable and the instruments, once the other exogenous regressors have been controlled for.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of the traditional first step of the two-step instrumented
regression. We further report the F-test of the joint significance of excluded instruments, as
well as the Bound et al. (1995) partial R2 (BJB R2 hereafter). As shown by Baum et al.
(2003), in the case of a single endogenous explanatory variable, these tests are sufficient to
assess the relevance of instruments. According to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of
thumb,11 our instruments are thus relevant. Nevertheless, in regression (4), the elasticity of
the 1968 stock of immigrants is not significant. The weakness of instruments being often
worse that the endogeneity bias itself, we choose to remain parsimonious, and leave this
instrument out of the list.
(ii) Supporting the Validity of Instruments
In what follows, we estimate two instrumented models. In the first, we use the stock of
immigrants in 1990 as the only instrument. This variable is actually the most highly correlated
with the endogenous regressor, and it is nonmissing for most of the observations. Conse-
quently, the model is just-identified, and the validity of the instrument, which cannot be
tested, must be assumed. In the second model, we run a GMM-type instrumentation by intro-
ducing simultaneously the lagged stocks of immigrants in 1975, 1982 and 1990. Even though
the number of missing observations drastically increases, the model is now over-identified.
Hence, we can test for over-identification restrictions. We follow the suggestion of Baum
TABLE 3
Pairwise correlations for instruments
ln(1 + Immigrants 1999)
Correlation Number of Observations
ln(1 + Immigrants 1990) 0.92 8,011
ln(1 + Immigrants 1982) 0.92 5,697
ln(1 + Immigrants 1975) 0.87 4,366
ln(1 + Immigrants 1968) 0.79 4,162
Note:
All correlations are significant at the 1 per cent level.
11 In the case of a single endogenous explanatory variable, a F-statistic below 10 is of concern. All our
F-statistics are far >10.
et al. (2003) in the presence of heteroscedasticity and run the Hansen-J test. A rejection of
the null hypothesis implies that the instruments do not fulfil the orthogonality conditions.
Regarding exports, the statistics is equal to v2(2) = 0.45 with a p-value at 0.8, whereas for
imports, the value is v2(2) = 1.25, with a p-value at 0.53. In both cases, we thus fail to reject
the null hypothesis. The fail of the rejection of the null is a further proof of the validity of
instruments.
(iii) Results From Instrumented Regressions
In the columns (1) and (5) of Table 5, we estimate the log-linear specification for all the
observations for which the stock of immigrants in 1990 is nonmissing. This slightly reduces
the sample. The protrade effect of immigrants is broadly the same for exports and imports,
with an elasticity at 0.112. Doubling the stock of immigrants yields a trade increase of 8 per
cent. This is the new benchmark against which we assess the endogeneity bias.
In columns (2) and (6), we report the estimates drawn from the just-identified model.
Instrumentation confirms the significant and positive impact of immigration on exports and
imports. Even though the elasticity is slightly reduced, which means that benchmark estimates
were plagued by a small upward endogeneity bias, the orders of magnitude remain fairly sta-
ble, around 0.095. To the best of our knowledge, no such a formal robustness check had been
proposed in the literature.
Columns (3) and (7) provide OLS estimates for the log-linear specification, based on the
country pairs for which all past stocks of immigrants are nonmissing. This reduces drastically
TABLE 4
Relevance of the lagged stocks of immigrants as instruments
Dependent Variable ln(1 + Immigrants 1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(1 + Immigrants 1990) 0.566*
(0.007)
0.503*
(0.01)
0.488*
(0.012)
0.505*
(0.013)
ln(1 + Immigrants 1982) 0.218*
(0.01)
0.242*
(0.012)
0.24*
(0.013)
ln(1 + Immigrants 1975) 0.045*
(0.011)
0.061*
(0.013)
ln(1 + Immigrants 1968) 0.012
(0.011)
Distance 0.055
(0.047)
0.106**
(0.041)
0.155*
(0.038)
0.146*
(0.036)
Contiguity 0.854*
(0.112)
0.665*
(0.094)
0.573*
(0.08)
0.534*
(0.075)
Observations 8,011 5,471 4,038 3,558
Adjusted R2 0.934 0.949 0.961 0.965
F (N1, N2) 6069.6 3969.4 2886.1 2285.2
N1 1 2 3 4
N2 7,805 5,306 3,881 3,400
BJB R2 0.44 0.6 0.69 0.73
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported here.
(ii) Standard errors in brackets, * and ** denoting significance at the 1 and 5 per cent levels respectively.
the number of observations. However, instrumented regressions reported in columns (4) and
(8) provide estimates that are not significantly different from OLS results. This confirms that,
even on this small subsample, the positive impact of immigration on trade is not driven by a
reverse causality or an omitted variable bias.
To sum up, immigrants do have a positive and significant impact on both exports and
imports. A doubling of the stock of immigrants increases the value of exports by 7 to 12 per
cent, depending on the sample and the estimation procedure. The impact on imports, between
7 and 18 per cent, is slightly more variable, but of the same order of magnitude. We further
find that these results are robust to specification and selection biases and that endogeneity
introduces only a slight upward bias in OLS estimates.
4. PRODUCT COMPLEXITY, QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND IMMIGRATION
In this section, we study the protrade effect of immigration along two intertwined dimen-
sions: the degree of complexity (or differentiation) of traded products and the quality of
institutions in partner countries.
a. The Complexity of Traded Goods
Rauch (1999) is the first to argue that trade impediments would depend on the degree of
differentiability of traded products. He distinguishes differentiated goods from those sold on
an organised market or possessing a reference price. In a gravity-type model of international
trade, he provides convincing evidence that proximity, common language and colonial ties
matter more for the former than for the latter. Using the same classification, Rauch and Trind-
ade (2002) even argue that the trade-creating impact of immigration, the Chinese diaspora in
TABLE 5
Instrumented regressions at the departement level
Export Imports
Just-identified Over-identified Just-identified Over-identified
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance 0.704*
(0.083)
0.711*
(0.083)
0.62*
(0.074)
0.62*
(0.072)
1.533*
(0.128)
1.541*
(0.127)
1.318*
(0.117)
1.312*
(0.115)
Contiguity 0.322**
(0.161)
0.357**
(0.164)
0.274***
(0.142)
0.281**
(0.141)
0.167
(0.196)
0.205
(0.2)
0.18
(0.192)
0.081
(0.191)
Immigrants 0.115*
(0.018)
0.094*
(0.026)
0.162*
(0.021)
0.159*
(0.025)
0.12*
(0.029)
0.099**
(0.041)
0.186*
(0.035)
0.239*
(0.042)
Observations 7,833 7,833 4,022 4,022 7,097 7,097 3,880 3,880
Adjusted R2 0.854 0.854 0.882 0.882 0.809 0.809 0.843 0.843
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported
here.
(ii) Standard errors in brackets with *, ** and *** denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels,
respectively.
their study, is much more salient for differentiated than for homogeneous goods. Hence, trans-
national networks would bridge the information gap between international sellers and buyers
in a more salient way for trade in differentiated goods.
We investigate a similar conjecture for French departements and their international trade
partners. We first match the NST/R industrial classification with the four-digit SITC of
Rauch.12 We consider two types of goods only: simple and complex goods. Simple goods are
either those exchanged on an organised market or those possessing a reference price. Complex
goods are all the other ones, classified by Rauch as differentiated goods.13
We estimate now:
ln ykij ¼ fki þ fkj  b ln distij þ ccontigij þ a lnð1þmigijÞ þ kij; (5)
where k indices the type of goods, with k e (simple, complex). Exports and imports, as well
as country and departement dummies, are now commodity specific. Whereas we assume that
the distance and contiguity effects do not vary across goods,14 the elasticity of trade with
respect to the stock of immigrants is also commodity specific. Contrary to Rauch and Trind-
ade (2002), we run two separate regressions for exports and imports.
Table 6 reports the OLS estimates for specification (5) in log (columns OLS) and the 2NB
QML estimates for specification (5) in levels (column 2NB ≥ 0). A first striking feature is that
the trade-creating effect of immigration is now different for exports and imports. Recall that,
when the type of goods was not taken into account, the protrade effect of immigrants was of
TABLE 6
Product type and immigration
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB ≥ 0 OLS 2NB ≥ 0
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Distance 0.775*
(0.072)
0.951*
(0.086)
1.492*
(0.099)
1.603*
(0.124)
Contiguity 0.371*
(0.143)
0.19
(0.134)
0.425*
(0.155)
0.082
(0.181)
Immigrants 0.141*
(0.025)
0.074*
(0.018)
0.123*
(0.025)
0.095*
(0.022)
0.029
(0.035)
0.075*
(0.027)
0.05
(0.044)
0.113*
(0.043)
Observations 17,711 18,800 15,396 18,988
Adjusted R2 0.809 0.766
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported
here.
(ii) Robust standard errors in brackets, with * denoting significance at the 1 per cent level, respectively.
12 See Appendix B for further details.
13 Berkowitz et al. (2006) follow the same dichotomy. Results are not drastically changed if we consider
three categories separately.
14 Allowing these elasticities to be commodity specific does not change the estimates of the impact of
immigrants. However, it reduces the precision of the distance and contiguity estimates, but, as noted
above, this remains difficult to interpret.
the same order of magnitude for exports and imports. By way of contrast here, immigration
boosts the imports of complex commodities (with an elasticity at 0.113), whereas it has no
significant impact on the imports of simple products.15 This is consistent with the idea that
social networks, by providing market information and supplying matching or referral services,
would matter more for the imports of complex products. Regarding exports, migrants have a
significant impact on both simple and complex goods. The effect would be even slightly
stronger for simple goods, even if the difference is not significant.
Such average elasticity could hide another source of heterogeneity, depending on the part-
ner country characteristics, as recently suggested by Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008). In the fol-
lowing, we disentangle further the protrade impact of immigration according to the rules of
law in partner countries, on aggregate flows first and then by goods type.
b. The Quality of the Trade Partner’s Institutions
Some recent papers study the impact of institution quality on the volume of bilateral
trade. In a matching model of international trade, Turrini and van Ypersele (2006) provide
new evidence on the deterrent impact of legal asymmetries on bilateral trade between
OECD countries, as well as between French regions. Besides, Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002) establish that good institutions would reduce predation at the border. They find that
a 10 per cent rise in a country’s index of transparency and impartiality yields a 5 per cent
increase in its import volumes, other things equal (de Groot et al., 2004; Ranjan and Lee,
2007).
Berkowitz et al. (2006) add that the quality of the exporter’s institutions matters even
more. They argue that, if some common contracts (as letters of credit, counter-trade agree-
ments and prepayment) exist to offset the exporter’s risk of not getting paid, such devices are
scarcer to offset the importer’s risk of late delivery and product defects. Therefore, formal
institutions, such as courts and arbitration tribunals for seeking compensation, are of primary
interest for importers. Most of the time, the courts or arbitration tribunals in the export
country are indeed the last fallback for resolving disputes, the reason why the quality of
institutions is more important in the export country.
Rauch (2001) puts forward the idea that transnational networks could be a substitute for
weak institutions or weak mechanisms of arbitration. But, as far as we know, this effect has
only been empirically studied by Dunlevy (2006), who restricts the focus to US states exports.
We further investigate the conjecture of transnational network as a substitute for weak institu-
tions on both the international exports and imports of French departements. According to
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), the impact of immigration should be greater for exports, as
immigrants mitigate any predation behaviour at the border of the importing country. Accord-
ing to Berkowitz et al. (2006), this should be the reverse as immigrants substitute for weak
arbitration tribunals in the exporting country.
Crossing the effects of migrants and institutions may allow us to identity which one of the
two previous views is the most salient. We use the rule-of-law index (RL) provided by Kauf-
mann et al. (2007) as a measure of the quality of institutions. This index measures ‘the extent
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
15 In the remaining, we comment the results associated with estimations in levels only, differences with
estimates in logs being most of the time insignificant.
quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence’. This variable is thus very close to the reality we want to describe.16
We proceed with the following estimation:
ln yij ¼ fi þ fj  b ln distij þ ccontigij þ a lnð1þmigijÞ þ qRLj  lnð1þmigijÞ þ ij; (6)
where the (log of the) stock of immigrants is crossed with the RL in country j (RLj).
In line with Rauch (2001), we conjecture that immigrants from partner countries with weak
institutions have a larger impact on trade flows, in which case we expect a negative sign for
q.
One could argue that the quality of institutions is endogenous to trade openness and thus
to the volume of trade. If this assertion is certainly right in general, we can forcefully argue
that France remains a marginal trading partner for a large majority of countries in the sample.
Hence, bilateral flows with France do not determine the quality of its trade partners’ institu-
tions. Moreover, the largest trade partners of France are high-income countries, where the
quality of institutions is already high.
Table 7 reports the estimates of specification (6). Note first that the direct trade impact of
institution quality is captured by the country-specific dummy, and thus, it cannot be separately
identified. Due to the normalisation of the RL to a zero mean, the average impact of immi-
grants is taken into account via the Immigrants variable. It is almost the same as in Section 3.
The interacted term ‘RL 9 Immigrants’ accounts for an heterogeneity in the immigrant effects
that depends on institution quality in partner countries. Our results support the conclusion of
TABLE 7
Immigration and the quality of the partner’s institutions
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB ≥ 0 OLS 2NB ≥ 0
Distance 0.839*
(0.086)
1.014*
(0.108)
1.510*
(0.127)
1.678*
(0.16)
Contiguity 0.449*
(0.172)
0.265
(0.176)
0.451**
(0.206)
0.18
(0.235)
Immigrants 0.085*
(0.018)
0.096*
(0.02)
0.047***
(0.027)
0.078***
(0.04)
RL 9 Immigrants 0.067*
(0.009)
0.053*
(0.013)
0.042*
(0.014)
0.058*
(0.02)
Observations 9,033 9,400 8,110 9,494
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.8
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported
here.
(ii) Robust standard errors in brackets, with *, ** and *** denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels,
respectively.
16 Kaufmann et al. (2007) provide six different measures of the quality of institutions. Due to the strong
correlation between these measures, we restrict the focus to the RL. However, results are unchanged
when another index is chosen. The index is decreasing in the quality of institutions and stands between
2.5 and 2.5. We proceed to a simple normalisation so that our sample mean would be zero and stan-
dard deviation would be one.
Dunlevy (2006). The coefficient is negative for exports: immigrants matter more when the
quality of institutions is weak in the home country. We compute that the elasticity of exports
to immigration ranges from 0.16, for the last country of the first decile of institution quality
(Congo), to an insignificant 0.01, for the first country of the last decile (the Netherlands).
In addition to Dunlevy (2006), we also provide the related estimates for imports. The impact
of immigration also presents a high heterogeneity. The elasticity ranges from 0.15 for the first
decile of institution quality to a zero effect for the last decile. Finally, the above-mentioned
mechanisms by which weak institutions could impact on trade flows are not exclusive. How-
ever, immigrants mitigate the trade-reducing impact of weak institutions in both directions.
c. Complex Products, Quality of Institutions and Immigration
According to our previous discussion, the protrade effect of immigrants depends on both
the type of goods and the quality of institutions. Hence, it makes sense to study the triple
interaction. In the following, we evaluate the cross-effect of institutions and immigrants for
simple and complex goods separately. Results are reported in Table 8.
Significant differences between commodities are observed on imports. Regarding the
imports of complex goods, the role of immigrants does not depend on the quality of institu-
tions. Since for complex goods, immigrants are a real conduit for information, they matter
regardless of institution quality. For simple goods conversely, immigrants do not matter on
average, because trading such goods does not require further information enhancement; hence,
the direct effect is not significant. This result holds unless the quality of institutions is low. In
that case, immigrants, who substitute for institutions, play an important role, as shown by the
negative significant effect of the interacted variable.
TABLE 8
Product type, quality of institutions and immigration
Exports Imports
OLS 2NB ≥ 0 OLS 2NB ≥ 0
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex
Distance 0.856*
(0.072)
1.008*
(0.089)
1.527*
(0.098)
1.654*
(0.126)
Contiguity 0.601*
(0.151)
0.389*
(0.143)
0.554*
(0.16)
0.299
(0.183)
Immigration 0.118*
(0.025)
0.058*
(0.018)
0.107*
(0.026)
0.084*
(0.022)
0.023
(0.035)
0.07*
(0.027)
0.038
(0.044)
0.106*
(0.042)
RL * Immigration 0.111*
(0.013)
0.065*
(0.01)
0.075*
(0.015)
0.05*
(0.012)
0.08*
(0.019)
0.023***
(0.013)
0.116*
(0.02)
0.024
(0.021)
Observations 17,711 18,800 15,396 18,988
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.766
Notes:
(i) Country- and departement-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but the related estimates are not reported
here.
(ii) Robust standard errors in brackets, with * and *** denoting significance at the 1 and 10 per cent levels,
respectively.
As for exports, neither the direct impact of immigration nor its crossed effect with institu-
tions significantly differ between simple and complex goods. In both cases, immigrants
enhance trade, even more that the quality of institutions is low, which matches aforemen-
tioned intuitions. The direct effect is slightly stronger and more heterogenous across rules of
law for simple goods.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the direct effect of immigrants is significant for exports,
but not for imports. The rationale for this result could be the following. To penetrate foreign
markets, exporters of simple goods need to collect many different types of information (for
instance, on consumers’ habits, local retail networks), regardless of the quality of institutions
in the destination country, whereas such information is not crucial to import simple goods. By
way of contrast, exporting complex goods requires to collect additional product-specific infor-
mation (for instance, on the quality process), beyond the one needed for simple goods. Conse-
quently, the direct impact of immigrants is significant for the exports of both complex and
simple goods, whereas it is significant for the imports of complex goods only.
5. CONCLUSION
The positive impact of immigration on trade is a well-established result. We add to the lit-
erature by assessing the crossed effect of immigration, goods complexity and institution qual-
ity. Even though numerous theoretical models underline this possible interaction, evidence
remains very scarce.
When we do not disentangle the protrade effect of immigrants across goods and institu-
tions, we find that the trade-creating impact of immigrants is slightly smaller than that found
in the previous literature. This might be due to our careful estimation strategy, in which we
consider variables in levels, country-fixed effects and instrumentation. However, these average
effects hide a large heterogeneity across products and across trade partners.
The trade-enhancing impact of immigrants is more salient when they come from a country
with weak institutions. Doubling the stock of immigrants from countries with the weakest
institutions increases exports and imports by 10 to 12 per cent. Conversely, the impact of
immigrants is barely significant for countries with good institutions.
Furthermore, immigrants substitute for weak institutions for the exports of both simple and
complex goods. Regarding the imports of complex commodities, that is, those for which the
information conveyed by immigrants is the most valuable, the protrade effect of immigrants
overrides institution quality in the partner country. Conversely, even though immigrants do
not enhance the imports of simple goods on average, they play an important role in interac-
tion with the quality of institutions.
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APPENDIX A
DATA ON TRADE AND IMMIGRATION
a. Trade Flows
Trade flows come from the SITRAM data set provided by the French Ministry of Trans-
port. It reports the value of imports and exports of 94 French metropolitan departements with
around 200 trading partners all around the world. French departements are administrative
units of much smaller and more regular size than US states or Canadian provinces. The mean
area of French departements is 5,733 km2, with a coefficient of variation at 0.34 (when Cor-
sica and overseas French regions are excluded), whereas the related figures are 162,176 km2
(with a standard deviation at 0.77) for US states (when Alaska and Washington, DC are
included) and 606,293 km2 (with a standard deviation at 0.82) for Canadian provinces (when
Nunavut, North-West and Yukon territories are excluded). However, the instrumentation strat-
egy requires that countries remain comparable across time. And the decade 1990–2000 has
seen a large deal of modifications in the drawing of countries with, for instance, the disaggre-
gation of the former Soviet Union and of Former Yugoslavia. Hence, we recover those
entities as they were before the separation:
 Four former single countries have been divided during the 1990s. In order to match the
data set in 1999 with our explanatory variables, we thus aggregate Armenia, Azerbaid-
jan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Uzbekistan, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine in a single former Soviet
Union. Czech Republic and Slovakia are aggregated in former Czecholovakia, Bosnia,
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia in former Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia, Eritrea and Ethiopia in former Ethiopia.
 We also aggregate three countries that have been reunified during the 1990s: Germany
(former DDR and former BRD), Yemen (former South and North Yemen) and the
Emirates.
We further consider as a single country: (i) Belgium and Luxembourg, (ii) Italy,
San Marino and Vatican, (iii) Denmark and Faroe Islands and (iv) Switzerland and Lichten-
stein. After this manipulation, 161 countries remain in the data set, with at least one positive
flow towards or from a French departement.
As noted in the main text, the value of trade flows is generally exclusive of transit ship-
ments. Petroleum products are, however, a noticeable exception. Hence, we leave them out of
the sample. We also neglect postal, pipers and other too specific shipments.
The distributions of exports and imports across countries are right-skewed, with a set
of few countries accounting for the largest amount of trade flows: nine countries only
account for more than 70 per cent of the value of exports and of imports (Germany, Bel-
gium/Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Switzer-
land and Japan). It is also worth noting that half of the sample (80 countries) accounts
for 98 per cent (99 per cent) of the value of exports (imports). Furthermore, import and
export countries are very similar: the Spearman’s rank correlation between importers and
exporters stands at 0.86.
b. Immigration
The 1999 French population census, from the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE),
provides us with exhaustive information on the number of foreign-born residents by departe-
ment. For each foreign-born resident, we know the country of birth, the nationality at birth
and the nationality at the time of the census. We are then able to distinguish between (i)
French citizens born abroad, (ii) foreign citizens born in France, (iii) foreign citizens born
abroad but having acquired French nationality, and finally (iv) foreign citizens born abroad
with a foreign nationality at the time of the census.
As the place of birth is more important in the construction of a social network than the
current nationality, we consider the narrower concept of immigrant. The French Statistical
Institute disentangles a foreigner, that is, a person whose current nationality is not French,
from an immigrant, that is, a person born abroad with a foreign nationality, regardless of his/
her nationality at the time of the census. Hence, if an immigrant acquires French nationality,
he/she cannot be considered a foreigner anymore, but remains an immigrant. Note that for a
few countries, it is necessary to sort apart French citizens born abroad from foreign-
born French citizens. The Algerian case is very enlightening in this respect. Eighteen
French departements count more than 10,000 French citizens born in Algeria, who are not
immigrants (Algeria was a colony of France until 1962). The settlement pattern of French
citizens born in Algeria and Algerian-born citizens is not completely similar, with a correla-
tion at 0.64 only.
The distribution of immigration across countries is also highly right-skewed. Eight coun-
tries account for more than 70 per cent of immigrants to France (Algeria, Morocco, Portugal,
Italy, Spain, Tunisia, Germany and Turkey). Most of these countries do not stand in the top
nine French trading partners. The geography of trade and immigration is thus quite different.
The correlation between immigration and exports (imports) stands at 0.65 (0.56). This correla-
tion is only 0.22 (0.20) when we restrict the sample to countries belonging to the upper med-
ian part of the distribution.
To prevent the results from being driven by noisy observations and the skewness of our
three variables of interest, we restrict the sample of exports, imports and immigration stocks
to the upper median distribution countries. This leads us to consider a sample of 100 countries
for exports and a sample of 101 countries for imports.
c. Description of the Instruments
The French population censuses of 1968, 1975, 1982 and 1990 provide us with a further
reliable information on the number of immigrants by departement and by country of origin,
used as instruments to tackle the endogeneity issue. It is worth noting that, for earlier cen-
suses (1968 and 1975), information is not exhaustive as it is extracted from a representative
sample (one in four of the whole French population). Moreover, for these years, we only
know the nationality of the residents (and not the country of birth) for a limited number of
countries. Hence, the number of observations reduces drastically when we use these variables
as instruments. The 1982 and 1990 censuses provide the nationality of the respondent, as well
as his/her country of birth. We are then able to recover an instrument variable closer to the
endogenous explanatory variable.
d. Summary Statistics
Table A1 depicts further summary statistics on the distributions of exports, imports,
-distance and immigration over the departement–country pairs. In the panel of exports,
there are 9,033 pairs (among 9,400 possibilities) of strictly positive flows, against 8,110
(among 9,494 possibilities) for imports, with a slightly greater pair average value (31,980
thousands of euros against 30,443 for exports). The frequency of null flows is then
quite limited here, in comparison with Helpman et al. (2008) for instance (half of the
sample).
TABLE A1
Summary statistics
Mean SD Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum
Strictly positive exports (9,033/9,400)
Exports 30,443.2 13,4961.7 0.2 311.4 2,122.5 12,621.7 3,500,597.5
Distance 5,321.9 3,758.0 110.6 1,956.8 4,608.3 8,358.1 19,839.1
Immigrants 470.6 2,224.0 0.0 7.0 29.0 140.0 56,540.0
All exports (9,400)
Exports 29,254.6 132,431.9 0.0 234.1 1,848.3 11,694.1 3,500,597.5
Distance 5,338.8 3,712.9 110.6 2,021.2 4,638.2 8,325.4 19,839.1
Immigrants 452.8 2,181.9 0.0 6.0 27.0 131.0 56,540.0
Strictly positive imports (8,110/9,494)
Imports 31,079.7 151,225.4 0.1 54.9 890.0 9,076.8 4,451,061.5
Distance 5,626.0 3,933.6 110.6 1,912.3 4,983.7 8,908.9 19,839.1
Immigrants 519.2 2,341.7 0.0 7.0 34.0 170.0 56,540.0
All imports (9,494)
Imports 26,549.0 140,197.3 0.0 7.2 392.2 6,335.9 4,451,061.5
Distance 5,577.7 3,704.2 110.6 2,238.5 4,954.2 8,615.1 19,839.1
Immigrants 448.1 2,171.6 0.0 5.0 26.0 128.0 56,540.0
Notes:
(i) Exports and imports are in thousands of euros, immigrants in number of foreign-born French residents.
(ii) Distance is the average number of kilometres between capital cities, weighted by their population size.
APPENDIX B
MATCHING THE NST/R AND RAUCH’S CLASSIFICATIONS
The NST/R classification consists in a three-tier nomenclature: 10 chapters, 52 groups and
176 positions. We match each of these positions with the nomenclature built by Rauch (1999),
who classifies the 1,089 goods of the four-digit SITC (rev. 2) system into three broad categories:
the goods sold on an organised market, the reference price goods or neither of the two. Rauch
(1999) provides a conservative and a liberal classification. In the main text, we use the conser-
vative one, but we check that the results are not sensitive to the alternative classification. We
cannot define a one-to-one mapping between the categories of Rauch and the NSTR classifica-
tion. Therefore, we measure how each position distributes across these three broad categories.
To this aim, we use a correspondence between the six-digit harmonised standard (HS6)
and the NST/R classifications on one side and between the HS6 and the classification of
Rauch (1999) on the other side. The distribution of each position across the three Rauch’s cat-
egories is computed as the ratio of the number of HS6 items belonging to each category over
the number of HS6 items composing a given position.
To compute a correspondence table between the NST/R and HS6 classifications, we first use
the correspondence table between the eight-digit combined nomenclature (CN8) and the NST/R
classifications provided by the European Statistical Institute (EUROSTAT; available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/otherdocuments/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSPOTHERDOCDTL). We
then use another correspondence table provided by EUROSTAT for the year 1988 to match
each CN8 item with only one item of the HS6 classification (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eu-
rostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LSTREL).
In order to compute a correspondence between the HS6 and the classification of Rauch
(1999), we use a correspondence table between the 4-digit SITC (rev. 2) and the 10-digit har-
monised standard (HS10) classifications provided by Feenstra (1996; available at: http://cid.
econ.ucdavis.edu/data/usixd/imports/conimp89).
Table A2 provides the distribution of each NST/R chapter across the three broad catego-
ries defined by Rauch. As expected, differentiated goods mainly appear in chapter 9 (machin-
ery, transport equipment, manufactured articles) and homogeneous goods in chapters 0 and 4.
TABLE A2
Distribution of the nine NST/R chapters across Rauch’s categories (in per cent)
Chapters Label n r w
0 Agricultural products and live animals 19.69 25.87 54.44
1 Foodstuffs 19.26 67.6 13.13
2 Solid mineral fuels 13.77 86.23 0
4 Ores and metal waste 0 60.54 39.46
5 Metal products 29.91 63.56 6.53
6 Crude and manufactured minerals 66.6 33.4 0
7 Fertilisers 3.82 96.18 0
8 Chemicals 59.42 40 0.58
9 Machinery, transport equipment and manufactured articles 96.5 3.17 0.34
Notes:
(i) n = differentiated goods, r = reference price goods, w = goods sold on an organised market.
(ii) Chapter 4 (petroleum products) is left out of the analysis.
APPENDIX C
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The first column of Table A3 reports OLS estimates equivalent to those presented in
Table 2. The second column, OLS (y + 0.1) ves the related estimates for the log-linearised
model, where the dependent variable has been replaced by the logarithm of 0.1 plus the flow
(in thousands of euros). This methodology has been used by Dunlevy (2006) and Benassy-
Quere et al. (2007) among others. The third column (ET-Tobit) gives the gravity estimates
building on a modified Tobit estimator, as suggested by Eaton and Tamura (1994). This
method has been used by Herander and Saavedra (2005).
The three following columns report QML estimates. The first column (2NB) depicts the
results of a 2NB procedure similar to that of Table 2. The second column (GPML) presents
another QML estimator, where we assume that the error term follows a gamma distribution.
The third column (PPML) depicts the Poisson QML estimates used by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006).
TABLE A3
Results from different specifications
In Log In Levels
OLS OLS (y + 0.1) ET-TOBIT 2NB GPML PPML
Exports (>0) 0.102*
(0.018)
0.101*
(0.018)
0.082*
(0.014)
0.092*
(0.019)
0.091*
(0.019)
0.24*
(0.035)
Exports (≥0) – 0.135*
(0.021)
0.077*
(0.013)
0.109*
(0.021)
0.113*
(0.021)
0.241*
(0.035)
Imports (>0) 0.054**
(0.027)
0.055**
(0.026)
0.068*
(0.024)
0.094*
(0.035)
0.095*
(0.035)
0.208*
(0.035)
Imports (≥0) – 0.032
(0.027)
0.057*
(0.021)
0.089**
(0.041)
0.120*
(0.047)
0.208*
(0.035)
Note:
Standard errors in brackets, with * and ** denoting significance at the 1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
